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THe UTaH WILDerness DeBaTe:
Interest Group Influence
and the Utah Public Lands Management Act
By David Hymas
Photography by Ricardo Rosas

WILDerness DeSIGnaTIOn Has LOnG Been a THorny Issue III UTaH.
NOWHere IS THIS more True THan III THe DeBaTe over WILDerness DesIGnaTIon on LaIlD COnTrOLLeD BY THe Bureau OF LanD ManaGemenT
(BLM) III UTaH. "OF THe 54,344,423 acres III UTaH 21.8 percenTls prIVaTeLY owneD, STaTe aGenCIeS COnTrOL 10.5 percenT ann FeDeral aGenCIes
COnTrOL 63.4 percenT" (WOOLF 1996,Al). OF THe 63.4 percenT, 41 percenT
IS manaGeD BY THe BLM. AS a resuLT, UTaH FInDS ITseLF CaUGHT
BeTWeen THe InTereSTS OF THe STaTe anD THe FeDeraL GOVernmenT.

While the issue has had a long history in Utah, it came to a head in 1995 with Rep.
James Hansen's (R, UT) Utah Public Lands Management Act (H.R. 1745) . The bill looked to
have an easy road to passage as Hansen had just become chairman of the House Subcommittee
on National Parks, Forests, and Lands, and the newly elected Republican 104th Congress focused
on an admittedly less stringent environmental agenda. Yet, despite an easy ride through the subcommittee, Hansen pulled the bill from a full floor vote because it lacked votes. Its Senate counterpart, S. 884, was brought down by a filibuster from Sen. Bill Bradley (D, NJ). Given the initial
support for the bill and the Republican majority this outcome was curious. Indeed, the debate
over the fate of some obscure redrock areas in Utah became one of the biggest environmental
debates of the 104th Congress. This paper will seek to explain how environmental groups
achieved this victory. More specifically, it will explore the relationship between the bill's defeat
and strategies used by the Utah Wilderness Coalition (UWe) and the Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance (SUWA) . It will look at the history of the bill and wilderness in general, the origins of
these groups, and strategies they used to defeat HR 1745. Finally, it will build a theoretical framework around their origins and strategies and how they relate.

HISTOIT OF WILDerneSS DeSIGnaTIon
Wilderness designation began as a government policy in the 1920s with the Forest Service
designating some forest lands as wilderness. Wilderness received Congressional protection with the
passage of the Wilderness Preservation Act of 1964. The act stated "it is hereby declared to be the
policy of the Congress to secure for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness" (Wilderness Preservation Act 1964). It originally set
aside nine million acres of federal land as wilderness and outlined a system whereby more wilderness could be added. Since the act's passage, the federal government has designated more than 100
million acres as wilderness areas (about 4 percent of the nation's land) (Hamilton 1994,47).
According to the act, land qualified as wilderness under the following conditions: (1)
the land "appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature with the imprints of
man's work substantially unnoticeable" [essentially meaning it is roadless); (2) "has outstanding
opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation"; (3) it must be at least
5,000 acres in size (4) there are areas of "ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value"; (5) there is a possibility that the land will return to a natural
state if left alone (Wilderness Preservation Act 1964).
Under the Wilderness Act (and later the Federal Land Policy Management Act), the
federal government commissioned studies on the land it managed to help determine how much
land qualified as wilderness. The Forest Service inventoried Utah lands under its jurisdiction in
the early eighties, and a bill designating 800,000 acres passed in 1984. The Carter administration,
and later the Reagan administration, commissioned the BLM to study about twenty-two million acres it managed in Utah. Out of the twenty two-million acres, the Bureau found about
3.1 million acres they thought might qualify as wilderness. In its final recommendation, the
bureau proposed designating 1.8 million acres as wilderness (Bureau of Land Management
1980).Green groups, like the Sierra Club, SUWA and the UWC, complained that in addition to
the Wilderness Act's criteria, the BLM added their own, such as excluding large amounts ofland
because of possible mineral resources, findings from field research teams being rewritten by the
state agency, reduced opportunities for solitude because oflack of vegetation, and excluding land

because of periphery development next to roadless areas of small uncoordinated efforts by national environmental
(Utah Wilderness Coalition 1990). The agency also exclud- groups like the Wilderness Society, previous to SUWA and the
ed land with roads, while the environmental community UWC there had not been any interest groups to form any kind
wanted to extend wilderness boundaries around some of of countervailing power in Utah. According to McFarland,
them. The BLM defended their inventory process as being in these groups would give the BLM more autonomy to make
accordance with the Wilderness Act's guidelines, while con- decisions and be the power broker between business and enviservationists said the process was flawed, leaving out many ronmental interests. Without countervailing power, the BLM
areas that should have qualified.
only heard one side of issues on land it managed.
Wilderness designation hurts business interests more
The BLM's favoritism to business and ranching
than other designations because no other policy has proved to interests also influenced the attitudes of early group founders
have such a far reaching effect at stopping development. and members. The experience of some of SUWA's early
"National parks can be developed to accommodate motorists; founders, most notably Clive Kincaid, greatly aided this
wildlife refuges can be logged, or drilled, or ravaged by speed- process. The Wilderness Society had hired Kincaid to review
boats and snowmobiles; wild-river designation protects only the BLM's wilderness inventories in the four corners areas.
narrow bands of habitat" (Hamilton 1994, 46). A wilderness He became so disgusted with the process, he and a small
designation, on the other hand, only allows visitors to use non- handful of others started SUWA to combat the BLM's efforts
mechanical transportation, i.e., hiking, canoeing, horseback, (Smith 1998, 6). While Salisbury would probably classifY
etc. Thus, grazing can continue, for example, as long as ranch- Kincaid as a political entrepreneur, it was some time before
ers do not use mechanical means of
transportation.
This idea of protection IS
critical to understanding the issue 111
Utah and other states. Conservationists
DeVeLOpeD IS TO Have IT DeSIGnaTeD as
realize that the best way to keep land
from being developed is to have it desWILDerness. AS a reSULT, WILDerness
ignated as wilderness. As a result,
Has Become a KInD OF "HOLY GraIL"
wilderness has become a kind of "holy
For Green OrGanIZaTIons.
grail" for
green
organizations.
Moreover, once land is designated as
wilderness, it takes another act of
Congress to change it, which can be a difficult proposition.
he began to receive large benefits from the exchange with
early members (Salisbury 1969). Residents of Escalante
FOrmaTIOn, STraTeGIeS anD THeOreTICaL FrameworK
burned him and other founders in effigy and used their picThe Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance was formed tures to sight in their rifles (Smith 1998). One could classifY
partly in response to the 1984 Utah Wilderness Act, which the early foundations of SUWA as a grassroots victim orgadesignated wilderness in Forest Service lands. The founders of nization (GVOs), despite the perceived harm was to the
SUWA saw 800,000 acres as a paltry number and vowed to environment, not the founders. Foreman would see Kincaid
not allow the same thing happen on BLM land. The Utah as a organizational entrepreneur because he had experienced
Wilderness Coalition was formed to combat the BLM's the BLM's "threat" firsthand and organized a group to do
inventory process. The UWC did not agree with the BLM's combat it. Early leaders could use their anger and frustration
findings, so they completed their own inventory of Utah's with the BLM's "lack" of consideration for their views to
public lands. After months of field checking, map making, and drive the beginnings of SUWA. Foreman also differentiated
photographic documentation by a network of volunteers, the between community based and condition based GVOs (1995,
UWC proposed 5.1 million acres be set aside as wilderness 33-53). SUWA is an example of a community based GVO
(this later increased to 5.7 million).
because the group formed in the Southern Utah areas around
These events would seem to point to Truman's dis- the most intense conflict.
turbance theory (1951) or Salisbury's homoeostatic mechaEarly leaders were inexperienced, however, in
nism theory (1969) with the Utah Wilderness Act and the grassroots organization, so in 1988 SUWA hired Brant
BLM's 1.8 million acre recommendation acting as the shocks Calkin and Susan Tixier. This fact presents an interesting
to the system. Truman would see the early members and later addition to Salisbury's political entrepreneur theory, which
growth of these groups as latent groups. However, the inter- describes how entrepreneurs set up organizations. When
esting thing in this situation was not how the two groups political entrepreneurs, e.g. Kincaid and other early founders,
reacted to other interest groups, but to the executive agency. lack skills needed to keep a group growing rapidly, they
Environmental groups have traditionally argued the BLM recruit other political entrepreneurs. Calkin and Tixier were
favors grazing, mining, and other development interests over experts in national grassroots organization, strategies the
environmental interests.
original political entrepreneurs had not worked a lot with.
This fact involves several iron triangles or power tri- Calkin had been board president of the Sierra Club and
ads (McFarland 1992) that have developed over time. Outside Tixier had been involved with several different public inter-
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est causes. Calkin and Tixier took SUWA in a different direction as they began to branch out across the nation in search
of members and patrons, rather than concentrating on
Utahans. In their six years with the group, SUWA went from
1,000 to over 10,000 members. They also established a fulltime presence in Washington to oversee Congress and the
Administration. These strategies were to pay large dividends
in future battles over H.R. 1745.
The UWC is also an interesting organization. Its
administrative base is quite small because its early founden
set it up as an umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of other green groups like the Sierra Club, Wilderness
Society, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) and
others from behind the scenes. The UWC has grown to
more than 35 member organizations, each of which is a
tremendous asset because each brings established resources
that the UWC can use in its campaigns. The UWC has
focused on gaining Congressional support for their 5.7 million acre proposal. As Berry pointed out, the success of a
coalition is more likely if it allows member organizations to
claim credit for successes (1997, 194). The UWC has been
effective at coordinating efforts without being seen in the
public eye as much as member organizations.
In his essay on coalition formation, Kevin Hula
pointed out several interesting ideas that seem to hold with the
UWC (1995,239-58). He divided members of coalitions into
core groups, specialists (or players), and periphery members.
Core groups are those groups forming strategy for the coalition, founders, and resource rich interest groups. Specialists are
groups who want to shape specific policies within the broader context of larger policies. Periphery groups are those who
join simply to be seen with the coalition.
In this case the Sierra Club, SUWA and even the
UWC itself could be classified as core groups. Groups like the
Wilderness Society would be specialists because they were more
interested in the specific idea of wilderness, rather than the
broader issue of other kinds of environmental protection within Utah. The Wilderness Society was formed in the 1920s and
1930s around the goal of preserving wilderness on U.S. Forest
Service Lands, making it a more nationally based organization.
There were also a number of periphery groups that
wanted to tag along with the cause. Smaller interest groups,
especially in the West, began to advertize the issue in order to
lend support and gain exposure. For example, through their
limited efforts, the Western Ancient Forest Campaign
(WAFC) has gained exposure from the issue. Currently, they
are pursuing strategies similar to ones used by the UWC to
get more wilderness designation on Forest Service lands. By
associating with the UWC, WAFC could gain credibility and
contacts in their wilderness endeavors. There were also corporations that could be considered periphery groups.
Companies like REI and Patagonia used money, publicity, and
supplies for the reinventory process to support the coalition
rather than any particular lobbying resources. They were able
to gain exposure through the UWC's efforts by linking their
names with the coalition. Finally, to broaden the coalition's
base, several sportsmen's organizations joined. For example,
the Utah Bowhunter's Association is a member of the UWe.
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In THe InTerIm
BeTWeen THe BLM'S
recommenDaTIon anD

OrGanIZaTIons anD Sliwa's
memBerSHIPS weLL
exceeDeD 10,000.

This is important because these groups are outside the normal scope of environmental groups. Indeed, many see the
members of hunting groups opposed to most environmental
agendas. Because they represented a larger set of interests,
these groups could give more credibility to the uwe.
Hula also points to the large problem, similar in
nature to membership within interest groups, of freeriding in
coalitions. Larger coalitions may even reach a point where they
resent periphery members. The UWC, on the other hand,
needed support in large numbers in order to "get the word
out." They did not have the luxury of being selective about
those who wanted to join the coalition. The UWC also differs
from other coalitions with the autonomy they retained given
the larger groups, like the Sierra club, within the coalition.
Hula claims the resources individual groups bring to the coalition determines group strategy. If this is true, the Sierra Club
and other large members would likely playa larger role in the
group and could hinder some of the coalitions autonomy. One
explanation for the UWC's autonomy is the fact the wilderness is completely within Utah. National environmental group
membership within Utah is not large. These groups may lend
resources and help to the UWC because their ideologies and
goals are similar, but their membership base outside of Utah
probably would not drop significantly if they lost the issue.
Contrasted with the Headwaters Forest (an attempt to protect
a large section of Redwood trees) campaign outside San
Francisco, where a large portion of the Sierra Club's members
live, Utah wilderness is probably not as high a priority. In addition, the Sierra Club cannot call upon a large member base
within Utah to help with the issue, forcing the UWC look to
other organizations to augment its support.
The early organization of SUWA and the UWC
combined with the slow process of getting the BLM recommendations to Congress in legislative text allowed SUWA
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and the UWC to mature slowly and gain support gradually in
Congress and from citizens. By thc time Rep. Hansen proposed his Utah Public Lands Management Act in 1995,
SUWA and UWC wcre strong enough to bring to light many
of its inadequacics. If the bill had comc immediately aftcr the
BLM's 1.8 million recommendation in 1991, its fate may have
becn different. The issue was localized and obscure nationally, and the Democratic majority may not have had enough
information to be familiar with it. Senator Bradlcy may have
still filibustered the bill, but his incentive for fl.l.ibustcring would
havc been less clear. By the time hc filibustered thc bill in the
spring of 1996, it had become national news allowing him to
branch out beyond his New Jcrsey constituency. In the interim
between the BLM's recommendation and Congressional
action, the UWC swelled to over 100 environmental organizations and SUWA's membership well exceeded 10,000. This
may have been very important for Sen. Bradley because many
had speculated that he was interested in running for president,
and indeed, his recent declaration that he will oppose Al Gore
for the Democratic nomination for president in 2000 lends
credence to this idea. The Utah issue allowed him to get his
name out to more people.
Following the BLM's recommendations, Rep. Jim
Hansen (R, UT) wrote a bill that would have designated 1.8
million acres of federal land as wilderness (later increased to
2.1 million) and released 1.4 million acres ofland protected
as temporary wilderness study areas (WSA's) to development
(U.S. Congress, House 1995). Environmentalists saw Hansen's
bill as one that favored industries over preservation. Beside the
lack of acreage, they objected to language in the bill that
returned any land in Utah not set aside as wilderness to multiple-use designations. Multiple-use designation allows development, off-road vehicle use, and many other uses wilderness
designation would preclude. Federal lands in Utah could
never be considered for wilderness again. Normally, the
bureau manages land in WSA's as wilderness unless it is designated something else or until Congress acts. H.R. 1745
took that power away from the BLM and gave some of it to
state agencies. This prevented federal agencies from protecting
land with other designations like national parks and monuments, despite the fact that the BLM had seen enough
redeeming value in them to designate them as WSA's. This
"hard release language" angered most green groups. The bill
also protected any projects or developments that were in the
"public's best interest"; an inclusion aimed specifically at protecting water projects already planned in the wilderness areas.
Environmental groups claimed that this would violate the
intent of the '64 Wilderness Act and significantly alter its
meaning (Nyhan 1995,2178).
For SUWA and the UWC, Hansen's bill loomed
like disaster on the horizon. They had to pool their resources
and make an all-out effort to defeat the bill. Their efforts werc
aided by the fact the UWC had written their 5.7 million acres
citizen proposal into bill form in 1989. Rep. Wayne Owens (D,
UT) sponsored the bill, but in 1992 he was defeated in a run
for the Senate. America's Redrock Wilderness Act, H.R. 1500,
was reintroduced by Rep. Maurice Hinchey (D, NY) in 1993,
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but republican opposition, especially from thc Utah delegation, kcpt the bill from ever leaving the subcommittee. With
Hansen as chair of the Subcommittee on National Forests,
Parks and Lands, members of the Subcommittee dcfcated
150021-9, choosing instead to concentrate on Hansen's proposal (Bcneson 1995,2359).
The UWC had to concentrate on what could be
considered an outsidc-in strategy. This is a combination of
Wright's inside and outside strategies. Wright examined interest group roles in lobbying legislators as they wrotc bills and
how those lobbying efforts help formulate policy within the
bill (1996,39-40). Thesc kinds oflobbying practiccs would be
considered by most to bc an insider strategy.Thc citizen's proposal, however, was written entirely by thc UWc. It was not
watered down with various markups or compromises. Oncc
it was written, the UWC shopped it around until they could
find a sponsor. This cnabled them to hold firm on specific
issues, but has, morc than likely, hindered more widespread
support. So while the Coalition did usc Congress mcmbers to
get their bill to thc floor, it would pursue a route not often
taken n trying to get the bill passed.
With Hanscn as chair and a Republican majority,
thc UWC could not mustcr enough support for H.R. 1500
within the subcommittec, so they took it to the rest of
Congress. This is where Calkin and Tixier's efforts really paid
off. By establishing a Washington office years before and
focusing on a national membership, the UWC could bring
acute attention on thc bill on a national level. Legislators who
did not know where most of these lands were receivcd calls
from constituents within their districts, grabbing their attention morc quickly. The UWC also used this advantage in
fighting H.R. 1745. Members across thc nation could call
their Congress mcmbers in opposition to Hansen's bill and
suggest an alternative, H.R. 1500. Environmental groups recognizcd there was no way to get their bill through Hansen's
subcommittee, so they focused on an outside-in strategy
inside Congress to get thc necessary 218 votes (a majority of
the House) to bring the bill directly to a floor. By the end of
the 104th Congress, SUWA and the UWC had amassed 116
cosponsors in the House. Pursuing this kind of strategy has a
huge cost of time, but according to the UWC, "we are lining
up support now for America's Redrock Wilderness Act, so we
will have something to build on in the futurc" (Utah
Wilderness Coalition 1 997, 1).
This time constraint provides a possible advantage
to environmental groups. Hansen noted that policy makers
will prefer interest groups over political parties when interest
groups have a comparative advantage over political parties in
providing electoral information and mobilizing constituents
and when an issue is recurring (Hansen 1987). The wilderness
question in Utah has dragged on for more than a decade with
no end in sight. This fact aided SUWA and UWC because
policy makers have turned to them in larger numbers as they
demonstrate their ability to provide electoral information and
mobilize the electorate. Despite their differences in opinion,
recently even the Utah delegation has proposed including
SUWA in forming a compromise bill. This points to the

stature SUWA has achieved over time.
SUWA has focused intensely on motivating the
electorate and organizing grassroots efforts. They initiated a
number of successful strategies in bolstering opposition to
Hansen's H.R. 1745. As noted before, the time between the
origin of SUWA and the UWC contributed significantly to
their success in defeating the bill. Using a mix of outside and
inside strategies, SUWA and the UWC were able to mobilize
members and the pubic to speak out against Hansen's bill.
First, Rep. Hansen and Governor Mike Leavitt
held hearings on the bill in five different Utah cities. Only
one of these meeting was held in an urban area, despite the
support wilderness enjoyed along the Wasatch Front. Using
an outside strategy, environmental groups put out the call to
arms and packed the meeting houses, causing many rural
locals to accuse SUWA of "fixing" the hearings. Pro-wilderness Utahans turned out en masse at all five public hearings.
"Wilderness advocates were in the majority at each of the
meetings even though four were held in remote rural areas.

NUmBer OF Acres
No Wilderness Acres
1 Million Acres
1.9 Million Acres

SUPPOIT (Ill perCenTaGeS OF UTaHanS POLLeD)

4·5
12.3

11.6

(approx. amount in 1745)

2.9 Million Acres
3.2 MillionAeres
5,7 Million Aeres
Agree With None

10.1
23.2
30.6

This public opinion gave environmental groups the
power to go before Congress members and lobby more effectively. By demonstrating to them that they had support in
Utah, and that the bill had become extremely unpopular in
the Congress as a whole, they could offer them a political
prize by placing them on "their side." Once on the environmentalist's "team", groups could identifY the Congress member with the support in the West.
Third, as the pressure mounted and H.R. 1745
gained momentum, using an inside strategy SUWA staffers
swarmed to Washington to lobby Congress (SUWA 1995).
Again the fact they had already established a Washington
office, combined with the continual efforts of members of the
UWC, enabled SUWA to step quickly into the fray. In addition, members of the UWC, such as the Sierra Club and
Wilderness Society, were able to mobilize their resources in
opposition to 1745. As Berry noted, different niches existed
for the particular resources of a given group (1997, 204).
Different groups in the coalition used their particular
strengths and contacts to fill these niches and lobby Congress
more efficiently and effectively.
The Sierra Club and Wilderness Society, among
others, both appeared before the Subcommittee to testifY
against the bill. The Sierra Club is famous for its lobbying of
Congress members by professional lobbyists (Wenner 1990,
285-6). The Wilderness Society divides its energies into the
following three areas: "research and analysis of issues, education and constituency building among the public, and policy

7·7

Source: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests. and Lands

Of the 22,000 comments collected by the governors office,
73% were in favor of [H.R. 1500]" (SUWA 1995,5).
Second, SUWA also initiated a huge public campaign against 1745. Using another outside strategy, they
urged members to target papers in Utah and across the
nation with editorials and letters to the editors. Papers across
the nation began to run letters on an issue many people had
never even heard of. Articles and editorials against 1745
appeared in western papers like the Salt Lake Tribune,
Deseret News, Las Vegas Sun, the Santa Fe New Mexican,
and the Denver Post. This was followed by coverage from
national publications and news organizations like the New
York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek, Time, Rolling
Stone, USA Weekend, CBS, CNN, and NBC News (SUWA
1995,4). Utah public opinion also turned on the bill. The following poll from 2 News in Utah showed most Utahans did
not agree with the wilderness acreage contained in H.R.
1745. A clear majority, 63.9 percent, of Utahans preferred
more wilderness than was designated in 1745.30.6 percent
preferred the previous bill, H.R. 1500, that Republicans had
so easily defeated in subcommittee.
This proposal was based on environmental group
numbers, and neither the BLM nor any other government
agency ever proposed such a large number. In fact, the ELM
could only find 3.5 million acres that even qualified for
wilderness, yet the public supported the 5.7 number.

BY DemOnSTraTInG TO THem THaT THey
HaD SUPPOIT In UTaH, anD THaT THe BILL
HaD Become eXTremeLY unpOPULar In
THe ConGreSS as a WHOLe, THey COULD
OFFer THem a POLITICaL PrIze BY PLaCInG
THem on "THeIr SIDe."

advocacy within Congress and ... [its] agencies" (321). While
the Wilderness Society may not have qualified as a specialist
group under Hula's definition, testifYing before Congress and
providing information on wilderness was not a difficult
stretch. Because they had these kinds of resources prior to the
UWC, the UWC was able to use them when they were
needed most. These groups' resources were greatly augmented by the specialized resources of the UWC and SUWA who
had concentrated on the specific Utah issue. The UWC and
SUWA were able to relate information to other members and
aid them in their statements against the bill.
Finally, SUWA staged an impressive grassroots campaign, a classic outside strategy. Letters from across the nation
began to pour into Congressional offices. SUWA also
encouraged and helped pay some of the costs to fly active
members to Washington to personally lobby their respective
Congress members. Berry noted that grassroots campaigns
often combine mail and member visits to Washington with a
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group's lobbying efforts prior to a close vote (1997, 134-5),
and this case was no exception. "Authors Terry Tempest
Williams and Stephen Trimble traveled to D.C. to give
Congress copies of Testimony, a collection of poems, essays,
and stories defending Utah wilderness, written by twenty
western writers including a Pulitzer Prize winner, a National
Book Award winner, and a former U.S. Poet laureate. A coffee
table book on Utah by author Brooke Williams and photographerTom Till was donated for distribution to U.S. Senators"
(SUWA 1995, 4). Other high-profile, outspoken members,like
Robert Redford and former Rep. Wayne
Owens, used their connections in Washington
to lobby Congress members as well. SUWA
also developed a high-tech, interactive
lnternet site coupled with an e-mail action
alert list to inform members instantly about
changing developments in the debate.
With this increased member activity and mobilization, House and Senate members had to declare their support or opposition
to 1745.With the decline in strength of political parties, the electorate is less likely to solidly identifY themselves with the platform of a
given party. As a result, parties prefer to remain
more ideologically vague and less issue-oriented. In Berry's words, interest groups are
policy maximizers and political parties are
vote maximizers (1997, 47). Single-issue
interest groups have helped defme the issues
with politicians. They have served to put the
candidate on their side or "the other side."
This is especially disheartening for candidates
who want to avoid declaring themselves on
the issues (Oberstar 1983,616-23).
Environmental groups have used
this fact to defme issues to their advantage, as
was the case in defining the support and
opposition to 1745. By placing candidates in
"their camp" or the opposing camp, the
UWC and SUWA helped the electorate
know who supported what. Oberstar, Berry
and Wright have all pointed out how modern technology has made this ability even
more powerful with the advent of television,
computerized mail techniques and professional public relations experts. These mediums allow interest groups to bypass political
parties and reach the electorate directly. This
contact was especially important in the
opposition to 1745 because Republicans had
a majority in Congress. SUWA and the
UWC needed effective ways, such as e mail, newsletters, faxes,
etc, to communicate directly with supporters.
Furthermore, use of wilderness areas has increased
since the 1970s (Lucas 1989, 41-55).This is particularly significant when one considers that this use translates into more voters
being able to understand what is in some of these wild lands. The
task, then, for the UWC and SUWA was to motivate and alert
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this section of the population to the Utah issue and help them
understand how it would affect them, despite the fact they may
never visit Utah. Newsletters, newspaper campaigns, and the
lnternet were all effective ways to help those outside Utah know
about the issue and see how it would affect them.
Oberstar noted Anthony Downs' theory on beating
an incumbent in talking about single issue interest group
strategies. According to Downs, an incumbent could be
defeated when the following three conditions hold true:
"First, a majority of the citizens are in a minority

on at least one issue under consideration. Secondly, when in
the minority a citizen has a more intensely held preference.
Third, the opposition need not commit itself on any of the
issues under consideration until the incumbent has
announced his position" (Oberstar 1983,621).
Downs' theory can also apply to a bill or policy that has a
majority backing like 1745 did. This theory is significant

because of the intensely held preferences of the environmental groups and their supporters, especially in the West. Policy
makers in opposition to 1745 could identifY with these supporters and gain their backing. Congress members did not
need to commit themselves to either side of 1745 until after
the bill was introduced in Congress and environmental
groups had showed its national appeal. Environmental groups

Rep. Hinchey (a first term representative) could use the issue
to show their constituents their support for the environment.
Even Sen. Bill Bradley (D, NJ) became involved, as he eventually filibustered the Senate version of the bill. As noted
before, some have speculated this was an attempt to gain
national support for a possible bid at the Democratic nomination for president in 2000. He had considered running for
president in 1996, and some analysts had even
linked him as a possible running mate to Ross
Perot in 1992 or with Colin Powell in 2000 (Rose
1995) . Environmental groups handed him the Utah
wilderness controversy with its national exposure
on a silver platter.
CONCLUSION

were able to operate on their "intense preferences" to help
gain support for their side. Rep. Hansen and his supporters,
representing the incumbent, had already staked out their
position with the bill's introduction. Environmental groups
made it next to impossible for anyone supporting the bill to
court the "green" vote because they had immediately come
out in opposition. They created a dichotomous choice for the
electorate and policy makers.
The UWC and SUWA could use 1745 to help
other candidates outline their environmental agenda. No
longer was the issue unique to Utah or even the West, with
the intense lobbying efforts and grassroots work being done,
it had become a national issue. Congress members such as

While H.R. 1745 did skate through the House
Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and
Lands (Beneson 1995,2359), once it reached the
House floor, support dried up, and the bill was
pulled to escape an embarrassing defeat, though
Hansen and other members of the Utah delegation
claimed that it was pulled in order to receive more
debate (Woolf 1995, AI). The UWC and SUWA
had achieved a victory many did not think possible
in the face of the odds against them. The groups
showed how a combination of inside and outside
strategies can help defeat a bill despite initial support within Congress for the bill.
This issue saw the extensive use of lobbying both at the national and state level. Strategies used
by SUWA and the UWC support Wright's theory
about how interest groups will approach Congress at
different stages of a bill's progress (Wright 1196,75113). Wright asserted that groups will first try to
influence the formulation of a given bill. Second,
they will try to influence policy makers by testifYing
and submitting written comments at hearings and
markup sessions. Finally, groups will focus on the
floor and conference action in Congress. They do
this by heightening their presence in Washington and
forming broad based coalitions. Grassroots organization is also important at this stage.
The Utah wilderness debate followed
these steps closely. In the early stages groups tried
to affect 1745's formulation by pushing for 1500.
Admittedly they had a hard time in the Republican controlled subcommittee, but they could use 1500 to try and
soften the language within 1745. When this was not successful, as noted previously, UWC members, like the Sierra Club,
SUWA, and the Wilderness Society, testified against 1745 in
hearings. SUWA and others also submitted letters and other
written comments to be entered into the official record in an
attempt to influence members (U.S. Congress, House, 1995).
Many wilderness advocates were able to attend the local hearings held in Utah, allowing them to testifY rather than submitting comments. Finally, after the bill passed the subcommittee, groups swarmed Congress members. SUWA staffers
flew to Washington along with different members of the
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group. SUWA and the UWC intensified the grassroots campaign to try and bring pressure upon Congress members
across the nation. Outspoken members and influential friends
lobbied Congress on behalf of the bill. The UWC also intensified its efforts in lobbying. The coalition was aided by the
fact it had broadened its base and expanded its membership
in the previous years, giving it more resources to usc.
The debate also shows the importance of a maturation period for an interest group. Talking about the early days
of SUWA, one founder said,
"".Working on leads, loans, and favors, [we] met
deadline after deadline on environmental assessments and
appeals. Our board could wait for its by-laws, a typewritten
newsletter would be put off another month, and T-shirts were
a good idea, but who had time? We fed off an adrenaline
cocktail: the visceral mix of gorgeous country, death threats,
and the unwavering support ofjust about every desert rat living in redrock Utah" (Smith 1998,5-6).
Early on, the groups simply did not have the resources, members, money, or staff to sustain the kind of grassroots and lobbying effort they did in response to 1745. Gais and Walker
call this a strategy of survival, one that is necessary for a
group to grow (1991). This is a key lesson. Groups must recognize issues quickly and try to delay them, so they can grow
strong enough to combat them. Policy makers, who want to
get laws through the process quickly, must try their best to
get issues through the system as fast as possible in order to
avoid future complications. This debate also points at a glaring problem with pluralist theory. Countervailing power
takes time to organize, meaning many issues may get through
the cracks before Truman's latent groups can organize. The
1984 Utah Wilderness Act demonstrated how iflatent groups
cannot organize fast enough, legislation they might oppose
can pass without receiving their input.
Unless a dramatic change occurs in Congress (such
as occurred in 1994), the UWC and SUWA groups will continue to pursue the status quo and passage ofH.R. 1500.They
mobilized the constituency effectively enabling them to wield
power when dealing with Congress members. This power
translated into promises of eventual votes. By turning the
issue into a national one, they helped promote their own
issues with the help of members outside the Utah. This support was vital considering the Utah delegation's enthusiastic
support of 1745. The same techniques will probably decide
future public land debates. Whoever can mobilize the constituency the best will attempt to influence candidates with a
vested interest in the issue.
The history of H.R. 1745 also lends some credence to Gais and Walker's theory of when groups will use
inside and outside strategies. They theorized groups will
increase their use of inside and outside strategies as the conflict of an issue increases. This was certainly true in this case.
SUWA and the UWC used a combination of lobbying
strategies coupled with grassroots organization as the conflict
surrounding 1745 heightened. However, this experience
would weaken their assertion citizen's groups usually concentrate on outside strategies. Even early on, SUWA was try-
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ing to influence BLM policy, and the UWC was trying to
counter the BLM's inventory process. They appeared at open
hearings held by the agency and consistently challenged their
findings. These activities were long before they had enough
members to initiate a large grassroots campaign. Gais and
Walker did not claim citizen's groups exclusively use outside
strategies, yet their static examination of a dynamic relationship may have left their analysis with some holes.
In addition, the coalition created by the UWC
contributes to Hula's theory on how coalitions motivate the
electorate by using their specific strengths. A~ discussed earlier, the UWC used different strengths of its members to lobby
Congress, support a grassroots campaign, and "get the word
out." One interesting side note to Hula's theory is how time
was an ally to the UWC. The coalition took time to develop.
It was a dynamic process over the space of a decade, allowing
members and staff to learn on the job. By the time the showdown with 1745 came, members of the coalition were ready
to fight it. More important, they had the resources to fight it.
Finally, a note on the future of Utah wilderness. As
of August 1, 1996, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt
announced a new study of 2.5 million federally managed
acres in Utah previously deemed unsuitable as wilderness by
the BLM. Various "career professionals" will decide the fate
of the land and attempt to finish the study in about six
months (Woolf 1996, Al). Considering the first study took
over a decade and cost millions of dollars, the process will be
difficult at best. Rep. Hansen has struck back saying that is it
illegal to do two studies when the law only called for one.
Several firms, like the Utah Counties Association, filed suit
against Babbitt, but were defeated in early March 1998 in
federal district court. The case is under appeal.
For the near future, no change seems likely. While
environmental groups won a battle in 1995, public support
might begin to wane as they desire closure. This happened in
Montana as the state witnessed sixteen bills concerning
wilderness allotments get defeated in just over a decade. The
UWC and SUWA have continued to seek cosponsors for
America's Redrock Wilderness Act (they currently have over
130) and Rep. Hansen is attempting to introduce several new
"compromise" bills. More than likely, Utah citizens are in for
a long political fight because as long as an agreement is not
reached, Utah will continue to have the government managing over 3.2 million acres as wilderness. Anyone who has
studied Congress knows that it is much easier to stop something from passing than to ramrod a bill through to law. This
is the irony; compromise has not been considered between
the 1.8 and the 5.7 million acre figures, assuring Utah twice
the number proposed in 1745. Environmental groups remain
quite happy with the results.
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